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ABSTRACT
In this paper we build a model of financial  intermediation that explains the GDP
variability pattern of an economy during the development process. We find evidence
that per capita output is more volatile in middle-income economies than in both low
and high-income economies. We show that, if the model economy is in the early or in
the mature stages of development, there is a unique equilibrium. However, in the
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In this paper we investigate the pattern of GDP variability during the development
process. We ﬁnd evidence that per capita GDP variability is low in both low and high
income economies, yet high in middle-income ones. We provide a theoretical model of
ﬁnancial intermediation that explains the high variability of per capita GDP displayed
by middle-income countries, relative to the low variability of per capita GDP shown
by both low and high income economies.
While there is a substantial literature on the role that ﬁnancial intermediation has
in growth (see the excellent survey by Levine, 1997), little attention has been paid to
its eﬀect on the dynamics of GDP during the development process. Our model high-
lights the link between the variability of output and the degree of development of the
ﬁnancial sector. We ﬁnd that in economies with perfect credit markets, or economies
in which credit markets are non-existent, the equilibrium is unique. However, when a
credit market exists, but is imperfect, there can be more than one equilibrium. This
multiplicity arises in the middle stages of development.
We build a model of ﬁnancial intermediation with borrowing constraints and
strategic complementarities that generates multiple equilibria, and in which agents
rely on a sunspot to coordinate their actions at intermediate stages of development.
This sunspot is a random variable with its own variance, which drives the variance in
the model. The more agents have access to credit, the larger is the advanced technol-
ogy sector in the economy and the higher are wages. Higher wages relax borrowing
constraints for agents who want to invest in the more advanced sector, and that gen-
erates growth. At the same time, higher wages do not decrease proﬁts or discourage
investment, because the size of the advanced sector is itself a productive strategic
complementarity in that sector. Then, since agents must decide in advance whether
to invest in the advanced sector, the return to their investment depends on how many
1people today choose to go into the advanced sector. This is the source of the coordi-
nation failure and the need for the sunspot to determine the equilibrium. Finally, a
multiplicity arises because the number of agents who are credit constrained depends
on the number of agents who invest, and if there is no constraint, the multiplicity
disappears, because only resource constraints matter.
Our model is a two-period overlapping generations model. In the ﬁrst period, the
agents are heterogeneous in their ability to work and, therefore, in their endowments.
In the second period, they become entrepreneurs and have to decide whether to use an
advanced technology or a subsistence technology. The use of the advanced technology
entails a ﬁxed cost, while the use of the subsistence technology does not. The agents
who want to become entrepreneurs in the advanced sector but do not have enough
resources to pay the entry cost can borrow these resources.
We also assume in our model that lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their
debts unless the debts are secured, and that the returns from investment are only
partially collateralizable. Given this credit market imperfection, the strategic com-
plementarity in the productive sector will be reﬂected in the ﬁnancial sector: the
larger the fraction of people in the advanced technology sector, the larger the frac-
tion of people that will have access to the credit market. The reason is that the
borrowing constraint is relaxed as the returns in the advanced technology increase.
This is the source of multiple equilibria in the model which arise in the middle stage
of the development process. By contrast, in early and mature stages of development,
the multiplicity does not appear.1
The paper also explores the relationship between the borrowing constraints faced
by individuals and per capita GDP variability. We ﬁnd that, in economies where
individuals face no borrowing constraints, or those in which the credit market is non-
1The idea that multiplicity is important for understanding development is not new, see for ex-
ample Murphy et al. (1989) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
2existent, the equilibrium is unique. However, when the credit market exists but is
imperfect, i.e. where there are borrowing constraints, there can be more than one
equilibrium. In this case, we ﬁnd that multiplicity of equilibria arises in middle stages
of development.
Note that, if the credit market does not exist or if there are no borrowing con-
straints, there is no interaction between the strategic complementarity in the produc-
tive sector and the borrowing constraint. In the ﬁrst case, only the fraction of people
with wealth greater than the cost of entry will become entrepreneurs. In the second
case, since there are no borrowing constraints, all the resources are used to ﬁnance
the payment of the entry cost for those who want to use the advanced technology.
Moreover, the interest rate will be such that the agents are indiﬀerent between using
the advanced or the subsistence technology.
In an economy with borrowing constraints, the income distribution plays a very
important role in determining the equilibrium. In that sense, this paper follows the
line of work of Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Carranza (1995)
and Aghion et al. (1998), in which income distribution is an important instrument
to explain the economy’s behavior in the development process. In our model, the
income distribution and the strategic complementarity eﬀect determine the number
of equilibria and the stage at which the multiplicity of equilibria arises and when it
vanishes.
In order to deal with the presence of multiplicity of equilibria, we assume the exis-
tence of a sunspot process. In our model, this sunspot process coordinates the actions
of the agents. In that respect, this paper is related to Cooper and Ejarque (1995),
Sorger (1994), and Spear (1991). The paper by Cooper and Ejarque (1995) presents
a model in which the indeterminacy of equilibrium is resolved by a sunspot process.
There, the multiplicity of equilibria arises from the existence of non-convexities in
3the intermediation process. In Sorger (1994), a one-sector neoclassical growth model
with borrowing constraints and heterogeneous agents is used to show that there can
exist sunspot equilibria. Spear (1991) analyzes a dynamic model of pure capital ac-
cumulation to show the existence of sunspot equilibria in a way that prevents the
model from collapsing to an overlapping generations equivalent.
Therefore, in our model, there are two central elements: strategic complementari-
ties and market imperfections, and both are necessary conditions for the existence of
multiple equilibria. The way in which the sunspot mechanism aﬀects the equilibrium
w i l ld e p e n do nb o t ht h ed e g r e eo fi m p e r f e c t i o na n dt h es i z eo ft h ee c o n o m y .I ti sa l s o
important to note that, in our model, the set of equilibria changes over time. It is
not constant. Moreover, the number of equilibria depends on the size of the economy.
Finally, the paper shows that the introduction of a new “technology”, a ﬁnancial
technology in our case, could positively aﬀect the growth rate in the economy and,
at the same time, be a source of higher variability if the markets were not complete.
The Mexican crisis in a globalized market environment illustrates this point.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the empirical evidence.
Section 3 presents the environment: a description of the model and a discussion on
the problem of occupational choice. The analysis of the economy’s labor and credit
markets, and the deﬁnition of equilibrium is performed in Section 4. Section 5 explains
the dynamics of the economy: the relationship between the level and variability of
GDP per capita in an economy with imperfect credit markets, an analysis of the
behavior of wages, interest rates, and entrepreneurial choice during the development
process, and a discussion of the perfect credit market and non-credit market cases.
Finally, the conclusions are presented in Section 6.
42 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we argue that poor and rich countries exhibit lower per capita GDP
variability than middle-income countries. Poor countries tend to grow slowly because
rapid growth is simply not possible. When a poor country grows long enough to
achieve a certain minimum income level, rapid growth becomes a possibility but not
a certainty. During this stage, the poor country may continue on its slow growth
path or it may “take-oﬀ” and grow rapidly. On the other hand, it is possible that a
rapidly growing country may suddenly “reverse course” and begin declining. But, if
rapid growth is sustained for a while, the once-poor country passes a second income
threshold beyond which economic decline is no longer a possibility.
We use the Summers and Heston (1991)2 data base for the period 1960-1985.
Following Parente and Prescott (1993 and 1994), OPEC members, countries with
less than one million citizens and countries without a complete data set were dropped
from the data.
Since we do not want to impose any functional form on our data, we will perform a
nonparametric regression with kernel smoothing, by which we do not impose any func-
tional restriction but smoothness (see Härdle, 1990).3 We estimate the conditional
expectation function of the absolute deviation from a linear trend, conditional on the
natural logarithm of per capita GDP. We perform a kernel estimation of the condi-
2We are interested in long term variability and, for our purposes, it would be ideal to have growth
series of 150 or 200 years for developed countries that were previously underdeveloped. That is, the
span period should cover from underdevelopment to development. The problem is that there are
very few (if any) countries, which were not already developed 150 years ago, that have series of GDP
that long. However, as Carranza (1995) reports, we could get the experiences of Japan and South
Korea that, in few years, evolved from underdevelopment to development. But this evidence would
only show one or two trajectories of growth of all the multiple possibilities that there are. Since, as
we will see later, we have multiple equilibria, we cannot have only one or two trajectories, and this
evidence would not suit our purposes. Given that, we use the only evidence available: cross-country
data for a group of countries that diﬀer in their stages of development. And we calculate their
variability for the period available.
3This method has also been used by Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) to explore the relationship between
inequality and growth.
5tional expectation function using the Nadaraya-Watson window and Silverman’s rule
of thumb. The advantage of our method is that we estimate the empirical regression
curve without forcing the data into a parametric window, letting the data to speak by
themselves as much as possible.4 As will be seen, the shape of our kernel estimation
of the conditional expectation function clearly follows a nonlinear pattern.5
In order to perform our kernel estimation, we ﬁrst regress separately for each
country the natural logarithm of per capita GDP on a constant and a linear trend,
in order to calculate absolute deviations from such trends as the ﬁtted values from
these regressions. Given the obvious heterogeneity among the diﬀerent countries,
we perform separate regressions by country in order to allow the coeﬃcients to diﬀer
among them. In addition to this trend, we also allow for dummies which are associated
with extraordinary events that occurred in those countries in particular years (years of
independence; civil, ethnic or other kind of wars; natural catastrophes; assassination
of the head of state or coups d’état). All the dummies that we include are signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. That is, any dummy reporting an event such as those described
a b o v em u s tb es i g n i ﬁcant at the 5 percent level in order to be included.6 There are 21
dummies in a set of 2,574 observations (around 0.8 percent).7 Then, we calculate the
4For instance, the exercise done by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) imposes linearity when using
OLS estimation. Our results clearly show that the linearity assumption is not appropriate.
5We also calculated a variability index for diﬀerent groups of countries. We ﬁrst regressed per
capita GDP levels in dollars against time for each country, calculating its trend afterwards. The
results still hold when the series are ﬁltered with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁl t e r .T h es t a t i s t i cw eu s e d
consists of the sum of each country’s squared per capita GDP deviations from its trend, divided by
the average per capita GDP. These statistics yield variability indices for each of the countries in our
data set. Finally, countries are decomposed in four groups by income levels (≤ $999; $1,000−$4,999;
$5,000 − $9,999;a n d≥ $10,000) and an average variability index for each group of countries is
obtained. Similar results are obtained if we calculate standard deviations of growth rates. The
result is a very similar shape to those that will appear next in Figures 1 and 2.
6In a ﬁrst step, we introduced dummies for all events of the nature described above, for every
country of the data set. However, there are events that will not be reported with a dummy because
those dummies were not found signiﬁcant. For instance, although we initially allowed a dummy
for the coups d’état in Argentina and Chile (1976 and 1973 respectively), this dummies were not
statistically diﬀerent from zero and are not included.
7For more details on the speciﬁc dummies included see Table A1 in Appendix 1.
6conditional expectation of the absolute value of the deviation from the trend. The
results are reported in Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
These events are typically concentrated in low-income countries. This is the rea-
son why we believe that if we do not correct for them, the results of the exercise are
being distorted. That is, the eﬀect of these events could result in a higher variability
of output totally unrelated to our story. Therefore, the fact that the kernel esti-
mation shows an inverted-U shape after controlling for these dummies suggests that
these speciﬁc, relevant events generate a transitory increase in the riskiness for very
poor countries. If we did not introduced these dummies, these events would appear
included in the general volatility.
In addition, we also estimated second-order polynomials in the log of real GDP
per capita for the absolute percentage deviation from the GDP trend, for six diﬀerent
years. We do not perform a nonparametric kernel regression here since we have few
observations in each of those exercises. In all cases, the quadratic term was strongly
signiﬁcant, yielding evidence against the restricted linear model. In Figure 2, we
have plotted the predicted values from the regressions and their 95 percent conﬁ-
dence bands for each year. From this ﬁgure, the inverted U-shape becomes apparent,
although the high variability of the data gives evidence of important unobserved het-
erogeneity that cannot be explained by the quadratic speciﬁcation (and much less by
the restricted linear speciﬁcation).
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
A version of Figures 1 and 2 has already been documented by Chari et al. (1996)
and Quah (1993). Both papers construct a mobility matrix whose (j,k) entries repre-
sent the probabilities that an economy in a bin j transits to a state k.T h o s em a t r i c e s
7show that countries in the middle income groups tend to move up or down more fre-
quently than countries in the extremes. Thus, very poor countries tend to stay very
poor and the rich countries tend to stay rich, but there are much more dynamics in
the middle of the distribution. Quah also speaks of a closely connected issue: the
emergence of a twin-peaks distribution. This bimodal shape can be interpreted as ev-
idence of a higher level of variability in middle income countries. A similar approach
is followed by McGrattan and Schmitz (1998).
Finally, the question we want to answer is how tight our estimate from Figure 1 is.
The asymptotic approximation is not a good answer to this question, which is why the
literature suggests the use of the bootstrap (see Horowitz, 2002). Therefore in order
to asses how tight our estimate is, we perform bootstrap replications. The result of
this exercise can be seen in Figure 3, where 100 replications have been calculated. As
can be seen, all 100 replications have a hump.8 This implies that, with an extremely
high probability, there is a hump in the original data as well.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
This evidence is somehow at odds with a part of the literature. Some examples
are Ramey and Ramey (1995), Mendoza (1995) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).
The last of these papers in particular documents a monotone decreasing relationship
between variability and per capita income level, building an interesting model that
accounts for that evidence linking the degree of market incompleteness to capital
accumulation and growth.
T h e r ea r es e v e r a lp o s s i b l ee x p l a n a t i o n sf o rt h ed i ﬀerent interpretation of the ev-
idence. First, with our kernel estimation, we do not impose any functional form
but smoothness. In their paper, however, Acemoglu and Zilibotti impose a linear
functional form when calculating their Figure 1. In fact, when we impose a linear
8We have also performed the exercise for 500 replications and the results are exactly the same.
8functional form, we obtain a signiﬁcantly negative slope (with a value of -0.0055,
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 percent), which is plotted together with the data in Figure 4.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of an additional quadratic term restored the inverted-U
shape again and improved the adjusted R2 signiﬁcantly (from 0.01 to 0.04). This
exercise illustrates that the monotone negative slope showed by their ﬁgure could
just be the result of the functional form chosen.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
Second, the independent variable in their regression is GDP per capita in 1960,
but countries move along the sample period raising an identiﬁcation problem. Indeed,
their dependent variable could be picking up two things. On the one hand, a country
w h i c hs t a y sp o o rd u r i n gt h ew h o l ep e r i o d( a n dt h e nw i t hl o wv a r i a n c eo v e rt i m e )
and, on the other, the case of a country that has become rich (and whose movement
along the curve changed its variability level). A regression in which only 1960 GDP
is used cannot distinguish between these polar dynamics, while our approach takes
account of the evolution of per capita GDP over time, keeping as much information
as possible.
Finally, the potential presence of an outlier should not require the elimination of
the whole set of observations for a particular country from the sample. We control
for outliers with the help of a dummy variable, preserving the maximum amount of
information.9
3 The Environment
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the model and then discuss the problem of occupa-
tional choice.
9All regression results from which the former ﬁg u r e sw e r ed r a w na r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
93.1 The Model
The model is a two-period overlapping generations model. At each date t,ac o n -
tinuum of agents of measure one is born. Each agent is endowed with one unit of
labor at each period. In the ﬁrst period, the individuals can only be workers. They
have some capacity (or ability) c with support on the interval [α,β],w h e r eα and β
are both positive numbers, a continuous probability distribution function h(c),a n d
a continuous cumulative distribution function H (c). As agents will be rewarded ac-
cording to c, this parameter aﬀects labor income in the ﬁrst period. In the second
period, the agents can only be managers either in the advanced or the subsistence
sector (and managers are all the same by technology managed).10 At t =0 , the initial
‘old’ are endowed with cv0,w h e r ec i st h es a m er a n d o mv a r i a b l ea sb e f o r e ,a n dv0 is
an o n - n e g a t i v en u m b e r .
The agents born at time t receive utility only from consumption at t+1.T h i si sa n
innocuous11 assumption that simpliﬁes the algebra. Each agent can choose between
managing an advanced or a subsistence technology. If the agent chooses to manage
the subsistence technology, she will have access to the following production function:
g (l) (1)
with gl > 0 and gll < 0.W h e r el stands for labor input, gl is the ﬁrst derivative with
respect to l,a n dgll is the second derivative with respect to l,f o ra l ll>0.
If the agent wants to manage the advanced technology, she must pay an entry
cost φ at the end of the initial period. That is, the agent must commit herself to this
technology. In the second period, she will have access to a production function of the
10This is just a simplifying assumption. If we allow the agents in the second period the possibility
to be either workers or entrepreneurs, we complicate the model without altering our result.
11Innocuous for our multiple equilibria result.
10form:
f (l,λ) (2)
with fl > 0, fll < 0, fλ > 0, fλλ < 0, flλ > 0 and fll >g ll, for all l>0.H e r e
λ stands for the fraction of people who choose to be managers in the advanced
technology sector. That is, the more managers in the advanced technology sector, the
higher the potential returns in that sector. Notice that the production function allows
for the existence of an strategic complementarity. This production functional form
can be rationalized by the existence of strategic complementarities in the advanced
technology sector (see, among others, Bryant, 1983, Chatterjee et al., 1993, Durlauf,
1993, Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1989, and Kremer, 1993). Moreover, the production
function does not depend on capital in the advanced or the subsistence sectors. The
results would be exactly the same if capital were included. What it is really important
is that the production functions have decreasing returns to scale in labor12 since the
managerial ability is also a productive factor that needs to be considered.
Two assumptions about the parameters of the model must be made:
Assumption 1.- Even if nobody is using the advanced technology, the net return
to this technology is higher than the return of the subsistence technology. That is:
f (l,0) − φ >g(l), ∀l>0 (3)
The role of this assumption is to focus exclusively on the source of multiplicity
coming from the interaction of imperfect credit markets with the productive sector
of the economy, ruling out other sources of multiplicity.
Assumption 2.- The entry cost belongs to the interval (α,β).M o r es p e c i ﬁcally:
α < φ < β (4)
12And capital if it were included.
11There also exists a storage technology. By using this technology, the agents can
transform date t goods into date t +1goods at a one-to-one rate.
The individual can borrow resources to pay the entry cost, with the obligation to
repay the loan in the next period. However, since credit markets are imperfect, there
exists an enforcement problem. The lenders can not force the borrowers to repay the
debt, but they can seize a fraction θ of the borrowers’ managerial income. Also, it is
assumed that there exists perfect information about the initial wealth of each agent.
In this model, the decisions are simultaneous within each period. Agents born in
period t work for managers who were born in period t − 1. They are paid according
to their ability. At the end of period t,t h e ym a k et h e i rﬁnancial decisions (lend,
borrow or invest in the storage technology) and decide whether or not to pay the
entry cost. At period t +1 , those who paid the entry cost can manage the advance
technology, otherwise they manage the subsistence technology. Managers will hire
labor at a competitive wage and, at the end of the period, will execute the ﬁnancial
obligations and consume whatever is left.
3.2 Optimal Behavior
In this subsection, we are going to analyze the optimal decisions of an agent type c
born at period t. This can be done solving the model backwards. Let us start with
the assumption that the agent has paid the entry cost at time t. This means she is a
manager in the advanced sector, and she will try to maximize her managerial income
taking as given the wage rate, vt+1.T h a ti s :
Πa (vt+1,λt+1)=m a x
la
{f (la,λt+1) − vt+1la} (5)
where la (vt+1,λt+1) is labor in the advanced technology sector and the solution to this
problem. Notice that, at this stage, the fraction of total managers in the advanced
12sector is known.
If the agent has not paid the entry cost, she becomes a manager in the subsistence
sector. The income from being a manager at the subsistence sector is:
Πs (vt+1)=m a x
ls
{g (ls) − vt+1ls} (6)
where ls (vt+1) is labor in the subsistence technology sector and the solution to (6).
Notice that in equilibrium v will be a function of λ;s ols and Πs will also be functions
of λ.
At the end of period t,a na g e n tt y p ec has wealth cvt. At that time, she must
choose whether or not to pay the entry cost and the ﬁnancial contracts.13 Notice
that the choice depends on the value taken by λt+1, which is the aggregate result of
individual decisions. This will be the source of multiple equilibria. We will deal with
this issue later in the paper.
The agents will pay the entry cost only if two conditions are satisﬁed:
Πa (λt+1) − rt,t+1φ ≥ Πs (λt+1) (7)
θΠa (λt+1) ≥ rt,t+1 (φ − cvt) (8)
where rt,t+1 is the interest factor for loans made at period t and repaid at period
t +1 . Interpreting equation (7) is trivial. It just tells us that the individual will
pay the entry cost if the net return of doing this is higher than its opportunity cost.
Equation (8) tells us about the borrowing constraint (which is the same as in Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997). This equation reﬂects our assumption that lenders cannot force
borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured, and that only a fraction
φ of ﬁnal income is collateralizable. If the amount of resources that the agent must
13The idea that agents choose technologies that are ranked by productivity and entail ﬁxed costs
has also been used in Cooper (1994), Durlauf (1993) and Murphy et al. (1989).
13repay at period t+1is greater than the fraction θ of her ﬁnal income, the agent will
not receive credit because she will have an incentive to default.
Deﬁnition 1 . For an agent type c,l e tu sd e ﬁne the indicator function Φ(c,λt+1,v t,v t+1,r t,t+1)
such that:
Φ(c,λt+1,v t,v t+1,r t,t+1)=1 if (7) and (8) are satisﬁed (9)
=0 otherwise
Let us now characterize the borrowing constraint of this economy. Using equation
(8), we can have and idea of the extent of credit rationing in this economy. Solving
equation (8) with equality, we get:






Therefore, an agent with initial ability c will receive credit if c ≥ cR (λt+1,v t,r t,t+1)
and she will be denied credit if c<c R (λt+1,v t,r t,t+1). Now, we can see how the
strategic complementarity in the productive sector is reﬂe c t e di nt h eﬁnancial sector.
The equation cR (λt+1,v t,r t,t+1) is decreasing in λ, that is, the larger the fraction of
population using the advanced technology, the more people will have access to the
credit market. Also, note that cR (λt+1,v t,r t,t+1) depends negatively on vt.Ah i g h e r
wage implies a lower critical level, so the fraction of people who are credit constrained
is smaller. In Proposition 1, cR (λt+1,v t,r t,t+1) will be completely characterized.
Proposition 1 .L e t cR :[ 0 ,1] × R × [1,∞) → R be a function deﬁned by (10).
Then:
(i) cR (·) is continuous in all its arguments,
(ii) cR (·) is increasing in r,a n d
14(iii) cR (·) is decreasing in λ and v.
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
4 Markets’ Description and Equilibrium
Before we deﬁne the equilibrium for this economy, we will analyze the labor and credit
markets, paying special attention to how the problem of multiple equilibria arises in
this environment.
4.1 Labor Market
The labor market at period t +1is composed of managers (agents born at period t)
who demand labor and workers (agents born at t +1 ) who supply labor. The total




where δ is the total “eﬀective” labor force.14
At time t, some individuals will decide to become managers in the advanced sector
paying the entry cost. Those who did not pay the ﬁx e dc o s ta tt i m et can either
be workers or managers in the subsistence sector. The managers’ labor demands




Φ(c,λt+1,v t,v t+1,r t,t+1)la (λt+1)dH (c)=λt+1la (λt+1) (12)
Z β
α
(1 − Φ(c,λt+1,v t,v t+1,r t,t+1))ls (λt+1)dH (c)=( 1− λt+1)ls (λt+1) (13)
14This is due to the fact that abilities diﬀer among the agents.
15Therefore, the total demand for labor in this economy is given by the sum of equations
(12) and (13). The equilibrium wage in this market will result from the interaction
of total demand and total supply (equation (11)), and its value will be a function of
the fraction of managers, vt+1 = v(λt+1). This is done in the following equation:
λt+1la (λt+1)+( 1− λt+1)ls (λt+1)=δ (14)
As we pointed out in Subsection 3.2, the equilibrium wage in the labor market
will be a function of the measure of entrepreneurs in the advanced sector. We can
use equations (5), (6) and (14) to solve for v (λt+1), la (λt+1) and ls (λt+1). We found
that v(λt+1) is strictly increasing in λt+1,a n dt h a tls (λt+1) is decreasing in λt+1.
Moreover, if the strategic complementarity eﬀect is strong enough, then la will also
be increasing. A higher fraction of people using the advanced technology will imply
an increment in the total labor demand and consequently a higher level of wages.
The next proposition formalizes this statement.
Proposition 2 .
(i) v(λ) is increasing in λ,a n d
(ii) ls (λ) is decreasing in λ.
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
4.2 Credit Market
Since this is an overlapping generations model, there cannot be debt contracts between
diﬀerent generations. All credit transactions must be realized among members of the
same generation. At each period t, only the members of generation t are engaged in
ﬁnancial transactions. Also, notice that the interest rate is bounded below by the
storage technology gross return, i.e. rt,t+1 ≥ 1, ∀t.
16The total funds, at any point in time, are given by the total amount of resources
in the economy, δvt. Agents who want to be managers in the advanced technology
sector at t+1m u s tp a yt h ee n t r yc o s t ,φ,a tt i m et. They can do this using internal




Φ(c,λt+1,v t,v t+1,r t,t+1)dH (c)=φλt+1 (15)
Then, the equilibrium interest rate is given by:
φλt+1 ≤ δvt with = if rt,t+1 ≥ 1 (16)
In order to clarify equation (16), note that equation (15) is a ﬁxed point problem
with, possibly, more than one solution. Notice that, when φλt+1 < δvt,t h a ti s ,w h e n
the fraction of entrepreneurs is less than the fraction of projects that can be ﬁnanced
in the economy, the interest rate factor will be equal to one. We can rule out some
solutions of (15). In particular, we can rule out any λ > λmax,w h e r eλmax is the
maximum measure of people that can be managers at any time:







The total fraction of entrepreneurs is restricted by the resources in the economy,
so it can not be greater than the funds available per project at any time, or the actual
size of population. An equilibrium in which the resources are used in an eﬃcient way,
that is, to ﬁnance the maximum number of projects, can exist if and only if:
λmax ≤ 1 − H (cR (λmax,v,1)) (18)
If condition (18) is satisﬁed, there exists an excess of demand in the credit market.
By continuity of cR (·) and H (·),w ec a nﬁnd an interest rate, r(λmax,v), that will
17clear the market. The equilibrium will be reached if, at r(λmax,v), the agents are
indiﬀerent between being a manager in the advanced and the subsistence technology;
or because the tightening of the borrowing constraint will squeeze enough people out
of the credit market, i.e.
r(λmax,v)=m i n{r1 (λmax,v),r 2 (λmax,v)} (19)
where r1 (λmax,v) and r2 (λmax,v) solve the following equations:
Πa (λmax) − φr1 (λmax,v)=Πs (λmax) (20)
λmax =1− H (cR (λmax,v,r 2 (λmax,v))) (21)
Note that equation (18) holds when the economy has abundant ﬁnancial resources.
Before analyzing the evolution of the economy, let us deﬁne the equilibrium properly.
4.3 Equilibrium
Notice that we can have multiple solutions of equation (19). This multiplicity arises
because the decision to pay the entry cost must be taken at the end of the period,
when the number of entrepreneurs in the advanced sector is unknown. In order to
s o l v et h i sp r o b l e m ,w ea s s u m et h ee x i s t e n c eo fas u n s p o tp r o c e s st h a tc o o r d i n a t e st h e
actions of the agents.15 That is, the sunspot is generated from a correlated device
from which the agents receive signals. The decisions made by the agents are functions
of the received signal (observed sunspot). In order to incorporate the sunspot into
the model, let us deﬁne ωt as the state of the economy at time t;a n dΣt as the set
of possible sunspots at time t, where in fact this set is a function of the state of the
15Here we follow the same idea as Cooper and Ejarque (1995). Their model, as ours, is inspired
in the idea of Correlated Equilibrium (see Aumann, 1987) as a generalization of Nash Equilibrium
in which agent’s actions are based on extrinsic noise.
18economy, i.e. Σt = Σ(ωt). Also, let σt be an element of Σt.F o r c o m p l e t e n e s s , l e t
us deﬁne a probability distribution of Σt denoted Ψt, i.e. Ψt ∈ Ψ(Σt),w h e r eΨ(A)
denotes the set of probability distributions over the set A.
A sunspot-correlated equilibrium is a sequence of sunspots {σt},p r i c e s{rt,t+1,v t},
fractions of managers {λt},a n dl a b o rd e m a n d s{lat,l st}, all of which are functions of
the history of sunspots, such that:
Optimality
• Given σt−1, λt, vt−1, vt,a n drt−1,t; lat· and lst solve problems (5) and (6) respec-
tively.
• Given σt−1, λt, vt−1, vt,a n drt−1,t; an individual type c chooses Φ(·) to satisfy
(7) and (8).
Market Clearing
• Given σt, λt+1 and vt; rt,t+1and vt+1 clear the credit and the labor markets.
Consistency
• Given σt, vt, vt+1 and rt,t+1:
Z β
α
Φt (c,λt+1,v t,v t+1,r t,t+1)dH (c)=λt+1
Notice that in this type of equilibria, agents use the sunspot σt observed as a device
to overcome the coordination failure problem. Therefore, when there are multiple
solutions for λt+1, the selection is made using the sunspot σt, i.e. λt+1 = λ(σt,·).
5 The Dynamics of the Model
The purpose of this section is to carefully explain the dynamics of our model. In
order to do this, we ﬁrst study the relationship between the level and variability of
GDP per capita in an economy with imperfect credit markets. Then we carry out an
19analysis of the behavior of wages, interest rates, and entrepreneurial choice during
the development process. Finally, we discuss the perfect credit market and non credit
market cases.
5.1 Multiple Equilibria in the Development Process
In this subsection, we study the process of economic development. We ﬁnd that, in
the early stages of development, there is only one equilibrium. The multiplicity of
equilibria arises when the economy reaches a minimum level of wealth that allows a
non-trivial fraction of people to obtain credit. Once the economy is at this stage, due
to the existence of a strategic complementarity in the productive sector, there will be
more than one equilibrium. As we will prove in the next section, this problem does
not arise if the credit market is perfect or if it does not exist. The reason for this
result is that, in these cases, the connection between the strategic complementarity
eﬀect and the credit market is broken. The multiplicity of equilibria will remain until
the economy reaches a new threshold level. At that point, some individuals will have
access to the credit market even though the measure of entrepreneurs is zero.
Before analyzing the development process, let us deﬁne the function γ (·) by:
γ (λ,v,r)=1− H (cR (λ,v,r)) (22)
The next proposition characterizes this function γ (·). Note that the slope of this
function with respect to λ is always positive, but the magnitude of the slope will
depend on the sign of the ﬁrst derivative of h(c) with respect to c, hc (c),a n dt h e
relative strength of the strategic complementarity eﬀect.
Proposition 3 . The function γ (·) deﬁned in (22) is:
(i) a continuous function of λ, v and r,
(ii) increasing in λ and v,
20(iii) decreasing in r,a n d
(iv) γλ > 0.
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
Next, we will analyze the equilibrium along the development process for an econ-
omy that satisﬁes the following assumptions:
Assumption 3.- h(c) is uniform.
Assumption 4.- There is an strategic complementarity eﬀect: fλ >B ,f o rs o m e
B and λ close to zero.
Assumption 3 is for simplicity. Moreover, it can be shown that if h is uniform and
Πa is a concave function of λ,t h e nγλλ < 0.
To ﬁnd an equilibrium, we need to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point of equation (15). We can
ﬁnd a set of wages close to zero such that, even though the fraction of entrepreneurs is
equal to one, there is no agent who can have access to the credit market. No matter
how big the strategic complementarity is, we can always have wages close enough
to zero such that the critical level of ability to get credit is greater than β.I n t h i s
situation, there exists a unique equilibrium in this economy. This equilibrium is given
by λ =0 .
For a higher wage, and given a strong strategic complementarity eﬀect, we can
have a situation in which a positive fraction of entrepreneurs can overcome the credit
constraint just because the same fraction of people becomes managers in the advanced
technology sector. This will be an equilibrium if and only if the resources of the
economy are big enough to ﬁnance this measure of entrepreneurs. If this is not the
case, the economy has still a unique equilibrium. As the economy grows, we ﬁnd two
positive measures of entrepreneurs that could be considered as equilibria. We will
show that, at some point, the resources in the economy will be big enough to ﬁnance
21the lowest of these fractions of managers. At that point, we have two equilibria. One
is given by the lowest of these positive measures, the other given by λ =0 .R e m e m b e r
that even if the measure of entrepreneurs is zero, nobody can overcome the borrowing
constraint.
From this period, the number of equilibria will increase to three, the ﬁrst two
being as the ones obtained before, and the third one given by the resources in the
economy: λt = δvt
φ . In this situation, such measure of entrepreneurs implies that a
much bigger fraction of people can have access to the credit market. Since there are
not enough resources in the economy to ﬁnance all these projects, the interest rate
must rise to clear this excess demand. We will prove that, for the relevant range of
wages, the highest ﬁxed point of this problem will always be above the economy’s
resources. This situation will persist until the economy reaches some level of wage at
which, even though nobody is using the advanced technology, the richest agent in the
economy will be able to get credit. From this moment, the bad equilibrium (λ =0 )
disappears. The unique equilibrium will be given by λ = λmax. Theorem 4 formalizes
this statement.
Theorem 4 . If Assumptions 3 and 4 are satisﬁed, there exist two wage levels, v1
and v2,w i t hv1 <v 2,s u c ht h a t :
cR (1,v 1,1) = cR (0,v 2,1) = β (23)
Then:
(i) For any v<v 1, there exists only one equilibrium.
(ii) For some v ∈ (v1,v 2), there are multiple equilibria.
(iii) For some v>v 2, there exists only one equilibrium.
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
22In Figure 4, we show the evolution of the equilibria in the economy. For a given
v,w ec a nd e n o t eb yλm (v) and λM (v) the lowest and the highest ﬁxed points of
equation (15), and by R(v) the total resources per project in the economy. We see
that R(v) is always lower than λM (v), which implies that λM (v) will never be an
equilibrium and that λm (v) is decreasing. See Appendix 2 for a formal proof of these
statements.
[Figure 4 here]
Note that if we had a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, the
highest ﬁxed point, λM (v), would be attainable. The implication of this is that an
open economy will be expected to grow faster than a closed economy. Moreover, we
should observe a higher variability for open economies than for closed ones.
Obviously, the variability in the economy during the multiple equilibrium stage
will be higher than the variability in other stages. The degree of variability will
depend on the sunspot probabilistic distribution. Since the equilibrium value of λ
is perfectly correlated with the sunspot, which is a random variable, λ is a random
variable itself. In that sense, in this economy we can use the variance of λ as a proxy
for variability. The behavior of the variance of λ is such that, when the multiplicity
appears, the variance jumps from zero to a positive value. Then, the variance will
be, ﬁrst, decreasing with respect to v, then starting to rise as the size of the economy
increases. When the multiplicity disappears, the variance will be zero again. The
reason for this behavior is that if two equilibria are close and one of them starts
moving toward a third one, the variability decreases until they become too close.
This is formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 . In the multiple equilibria stage, the variability of the output ﬁrst
decreases and then increases.
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
23In order to prove Proposition 5, we use a time-invariant probability distribution
in which each sunspot has the same probability each period. The results are the
same if we use symmetric ﬁrst-order Markov probabilities in which the probability
of observing a given sunspot this period will depend on the sunspot observed last
period. The results are not robust to all non-symmetric Markov probabilities or
other time-depending probabilities.
5.2 Wages, Interest Rates and Entrepreneurship
In this subsection, we will study the equilibrium values of wages, interest rates, and
measure of entrepreneurs during the development process. We will prove that, if
an economy satisﬁes two conditions for growth, then, for any initial condition v0,
the economy will converge to the long run equilibrium with positive probability. The
conditions for growth imply that there exists a minimum required level of productivity
in the subsistence technology, and that the set of sunspots that implies the “good”
equilibrium with probability zero has measure zero.
The conditions for growth are the following:
gl (δ) >w
0 and m(A) > 0
where m(A) is the measure of a set A,a n dA = {σt :P r[ λ(σt)=R(vt)] > 0}.T h e
ﬁrst condition guarantees that the economy will reach the multiple equilibria stage.
The second implies that the economy will leave that stage.
If the condition for growth is satisﬁed, the economy will reach the multiple equi-
libria stage and, with positive probability, will be at the highest equilibrium. The
main mechanism is that the more agents have access to credit, the larger is the high
productivity sector in the economy and the higher are wages. Higher wages relax
borrowing constraints for agents who want to invest in the more productive sector
and that generates growth. At the same time, higher wages do not decrease proﬁts
24and discourage investment because the size of the advance sector is itself a productive
externality in that sector.
We can construct a sequence of λt from t equals one to T,i nw h i c hλT takes
the highest value. This sequence has a positive probability if T<∞.S i n c e λt is
increasing at some ﬁnite rate, the economy will leave this stage and will converge to
the long run equilibrium: λ
∗ =1 , r∗ =1and v∗ = fl (δ,λ
∗).T h i sf a c ti sp r o v e di n
the next theorem.
Theorem 6 . If the condition for growth is satisﬁed, for any initial v0 and with
positive probability, when t goes to ∞:
(i) λt converges to 1
(ii) rt converges to 1,a n d
(iii) vt converges to v∗,w h e r ev∗ = fl (δ,λ
∗).
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
5.3 Credit Market and Variability
The purpose of this subsection is to analyze how diﬀerent degrees of imperfection
in the credit market will aﬀect the equilibrium of the economy. In Subsection 5.1,
we have already seen that, when there exist imperfections in the credit market (i.e.
0 < θ < 1), we could have multiple equilibria. Now, we show that when the credit
market is perfect, i.e. θ =1 , or when the credit market does not exist, i.e. θ =0 ,t h e
equilibrium will be unique. The reason for this is that, when there is no credit market,
there is no interaction between the strategic complementarity in the productive sector
and the borrowing constraint. Only the fraction of people with wealth greater than
the entry cost will become entrepreneurs. Also, when the credit market is perfect,
there are no longer borrowing constraints and, therefore, all the resources are used
to ﬁnance the payment of the entry cost of those who want to use the advanced
25technology. The interest rate will be such that the agents are indiﬀerent between
using the advanced or the subsistence technology. Subsubsections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 will
study both cases.
5.3.1 Perfect-Credit Market Economy
Suppose that v0 <
φ
δ. This condition means that the initial resources are not enough
to ﬁnance all the people in this economy. The fraction of people who become man-
agers in the advanced technology sector is given by λ0 = δv0
φ .S i n c e ,b ya s s u m p t i o n ,
it is proﬁtable to be a manager when the interest rate is one, everybody will demand
credit for investment. In order for the credit market to clear, the interest rate will
have to rise.
Once we have λ0, the wage rate for the next period, v1, can be uniquely determined
using v1 = v (λ) (see Section 4). Notice that, even though we have a strategic
complementarity in the productive sector, each time the measure of entrepreneurs is
only determined by the resource constraints in the economy. The next proposition
formalizes this statement.
Proposition 7 . Given some endowment cv0 for the initial old people such that
v0 <
φ
δ, if the credit market is perfect, then:
(i) At each t, there is only one equilibrium, i.e. vt, λt+1,a n drt,t+1 are uniquely
determined.
(ii) The equilibrium sequences {vt} and {λt} are non decreasing and converge to
the long run equilibrium.
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
It is worthwhile to notice the behavior of the interest rate. When λ < 1, rt,t+1 (λ)
is increasing in λ. The reason for this is that, as the total fraction of managers
increases in this economy, the managerial proﬁts also increase (due to the strategic
26complementarity). As a result, the interest rate needed to clear this market is higher.
However, as soon as λ reaches the value of one, the ﬁnancial resources are abundant
relative to the population resources (the fraction of managers can not be greater than
one) and the interest rate will drop abruptly to one (the storage technology return).
Notice that we can observe the same situation when there exist multiple equilibria. In
that case, the drastic change in interest rate will be accompanied by a drastic change
in λ. However, when the credit market is perfect, a drastic change in interest rate will
be caused by a change of regime. The economy moves from a resource-constrained
economy to a resource-unconstrained economy. In this case, a large movement in the
interest rate is accompanied by a small change in λ.
5.3.2 Non Credit Market Economy
Suppose now that the initial condition over v0 is such that β v0 < φ, which implies
that nobody will become an entrepreneur in period one. The wage rate in that period
will be given by v1 = gl (δ). In this case, the condition for growth is that v1 >
φ
β;
otherwise the advanced technology will never be used. Notice that, when there is no
credit market or when the credit market is incomplete, there are some conditions on
the productivity of the subsistence sector (see Subsection 5.2) to guarantee that the
economy will take oﬀ. This is not the case when the credit market is perfect.
Since people cannot borrow, the entry cost must be self-ﬁnanced. Then, given





will become managers in the next
period. Once λt−1 is known, the wage rate vt+1 can be easily determined (see Section
4). Then the sequences of wages {vt} and measures of managers {λt} are uniquely
determined, and they will converge to the long-run equilibrium. The next proposition
formalizes this statement.
Proposition 8 . Given some endowment cv0 for the initial old people such that
27v0 <
φ
β, if the credit market does not exist and gl (δ) >
φ
β,t h e n :
(i) At each period t, there is only one equilibrium, i.e. vt and λt+1 are uniquely
determined.
(ii) The equilibrium sequences {vt} and {λt} are non decreasing and converge to
the long run equilibrium.
Proof. [See Appendix 2].
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper explains the GDP variability pattern of an economy during the devel-
opment process. We show that, at the middle stages of development, the economy
experiences high levels of GDP variability. On the other hand, in early and ma-
ture stages of development, we observe a much lower variability in per capita GDP.
This variability is explained because, in an imperfect credit market environment, the
number of equilibria will depend on the size of the economy. In particular, when
the economy is very poor, there is only one possible equilibrium. After the economy
reaches some threshold level, there can be multiple equilibria. This multiplicity dis-
appears when the economy is fully developed. The existence of multiple equilibria is
due to the fact that the strategic complementarity in the productive sector will be re-
ﬂected in the ﬁnancial one. A larger fraction of people using the advanced technology
will imply a larger fraction of people with access to the credit market.
The relationship between the degree of development of the ﬁnancial sector and
the variability in the economy is also analyzed. We show that, in the case of either
economies with perfect credit markets or economies in which the credit markets are
non-existent, the equilibrium is unique. However, when the credit market exists but
is imperfect, there could be more than one equilibrium. In the latter case, the multi-
plicity arises in the middle stages of development. This is due to the fact that when
28there is no credit market, there is no interaction between the strategic complementar-
ity in the productive sector and the borrowing constraint. Only the fraction of people
with wealth greater than the entry cost will become entrepreneurs. Also, when the
credit market is perfect, there are no borrowing constraints, and all the resources are
used to ﬁnance the payment of the entry cost for those who want to use the advanced
technology.
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Table A1. Country Dummies
Country Dummy’s Year Historical Fact
Burundi 1960 Pre-independence political unrest and confrontation (Hutus vs. Tutsis)
1961 Pre-independence political unrest and confrontation (Hutus vs. Tutsis)
1965 Rebellion of Hutus (civil war)
1970 Purge of Tutsis
Chad 1960 Year of independece
1973 Starts Libyan occupation of the Tibesti (North) region (1973-94)
1976 Political unrrest following the assessination of the head of state
1977 Libia annexed strip of Chadian teritory
1978 War with Libia and political unrest
1979 War with Libia and political unrest
1982 Government overthrow and civil war
1983 Civil war
1984 Civil war
Lesotho 1970 Coup d’état
1971 Political unrest and confrontation following the coup d’état
Mali 1960 Year of independence
1961 Political unrest and confrontation following the year of independence
Rwanda 1964 Raid from Burundi
1965 Confrontation Tutsis vs. Hutus
Togo 1963 Assessination of the head of state
Myanmar 1963 M i l i t a r yt o o ko v e rt h eg o v e r n m e n t
Source: Encyclopedia Britanica (2000).
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :First of all, we need to prove that Πa (λ) is a contin-
uous function of λ.
Claim: Πa (λ) is a continuous and increasing function of λ.
Proof. In order to prove this claim, we need to use a result that will be proved
later (Proposition 2): v (λ) is a continuous and increasing function of λ.G i v e n
that f (l,λ)−v(λ)l is bounded from above, continuous in l and λ,a n dw i t hc o m p a c t
range, we can apply the Theorem of the Maximum to show that Πa (λ) is a continuous
function. To see that it is increasing in λ, just take derivatives with respect to λ and







This is positive if the average labor productivity is greater than the marginal labor
productivity, which is the present case (see Proposition 2).
(i) By our claim, it is easy to see that cR (·) is continuous in λ, r,a n dv.






2 > 0 (25)


















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Given that all the conditions are satisﬁed for the The-
orem of the Maximum, we can apply it to equations (5) and (6). After maximizing,
we get the following equations:
fl (la (v,λ),λ)=v (28)
31gl (ls (v)) = v (29)
Now, using the equilibrium market condition (14), we have a system of three
equations with three unknowns: la (λ,δ), ls (λ,δ) and v(λ,δ). This can be reduced
to a system of two equations (solving for ls (λ,δ)). Taking derivatives with respect to
















































. Notice that since it must be the case that for any
(v,λ) when λ > 0, la >l s,t h e nla > δ. Therefore, it is easy to see that ∂v
∂λ > 0.
Moreover, if the strategic complementarity eﬀect is strong enough, i.e. if flλ is large
enough, then la will also be increasing.
Now, it follows from (6) that ls (v) is a decreasing function of v, and since v is
an increasing function of λ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tls is a decreasing function of λ.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) The continuity of γ (·) follows from the continuity of H (·) and the continuity
of cR (·).
(ii) Since cR (·) is decreasing in λ and v,a n dH (·) is increasing in c,t h i sp r o v e s
that γ (·) is increasing in λ and v.
(iii) To prove that γ (·) is decreasing in r, just note that cR (·) is increasing in r
and H (·) is increasing in c.







Equation (32) is positive because of Proposition 1 part (iii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4:
(i) For any v<v 1,w eh a v et h a tcR (1,v,1) > β.T h e nγ (λ,v,1) = 0 for any λ.
The only equilibrium is λ =0 .
32(ii) Because of (23) and the continuity of cR (·),w ec a nd e ﬁne a function λ
z (v)
for v ∈ (v1,v 2) such that:
cR (λ
z (v),v,1) = β (33)
Notice that λ
z (·) is decreasing in v, γλ (·)=0for λ ≤ λ
z (v),a n dγλ (·) > 0 for
λ > λ
z (v). Notice also that, for λ ∈ (λ
z (v),β), γλλ < 0.S i n c eh(·) and
∂cR(·)
∂λ are
continuous functions, we can have v0 and λ
0 such that:
λ
0 = γ (λ
0,v
0,1) and γλ (λ
0,v
0,1) = 1 (34)
Assuming that cR (1,v 2,1) > α (we can pick α close enough to zero), we can deﬁne
two functions: λm :[ v0,v 2] → [0,λ
0] and λM :[ v0,v 2] → [λ
0,λ
00], such that:
λj (v)=γ (λj (v),v,1) for j = m,M (35)
Claim: The functions in equation (35) exist and are well deﬁned.
Proof. Note that for any v ∈ (v0,v 2): λ
z (v) > γ (λ
z (v),v,1); γ (λ
0,v,1) > λ
0 and
γ (1,v,1) < 1. Then, due to the continuity of γ,f o re a c hv, there exist two func-
tions λm and λM, such that they are the ﬁxed points of equation (35). Moreover,
λm (v) ∈ (λ
z (v),λ
0),a n dλM ∈ (λ
0,1).
Claim: λm (v) is a decreasing function and λM (v) is an increasing function.
Proof. For λm (v), suppose not. Take w1 <w 2. Then, for any λ ∈ (λm (v),λ
0),
γ (λ,w 1,1) > λ.B u t ,γ (λm (w2),w 2,1) > γ (λm (w2),w 1,1) > λm (w2).Ac o n t r a d i c -
tion.
For λM (v), suppose not. Take w1 <w 2. Then, for any λ ∈ (λ
0,λM (v)),
γ (λ,w 1,1) > λ.B u t , γ (λM (w2),w 2,1) > γ (λM (w2),w 1,1) > λM (w2).A c o n -
tradiction.






Assume that v0 is such that λ
0 > δv0
φ . Then, at v0, the only equilibrium is given
by λ =0 .S i n c e λm (v) is decreasing, R(v) is increasing and R(v2) > λm (v2)=0 ,
then, there exists a level of wage w0 such that R(w0)=λm (w0).A tw0,t h e r ea r et w o
equilibria: λ =0and λ = R(w0)=λm (w0).
33For any v ∈ (w0,v 2) there are three equilibria: λ =0 , λ = λm (w0),a n dλ =
min{R(v),λM (v)}.T h eﬁrst two equilibria are obvious. We need to show that the
third equilibrium exists. Then, we will show that for any v ≤ v2, R(v) < λM (v).
First, suppose that R(v) < λM (v).T h e n , λM (v) is not an equilibrium. Since
γ (R(v),v,1) >R(v), there exists r = r0 (R(v)) such that γ (R(v),v,r 0 (R(v))) =
R(v). The continuity of γ (·) guarantees the existence of such interest rate. See
Section 4 for a proper deﬁnition of r0 (R(v)). Now, suppose that λM (v) <R (v).
Then, by deﬁnition, λM (v) is an equilibrium. Since γ (R(v),v,1) <R (v),t h e n
R(v) can not be an equilibrium. Note that, at v = v2, λm (v2)=0 . That means that
at v = v2, there are only two equilibria.
It is easy to see that, in fact, R(v) < λM (v) for all v<v 2.F i r s t , d e ﬁne v00
as: cR (1,v00,1) = α. It is trivial to show that v00 >v 2. Then, we can extend the
domain of the function λM (v) from [v0,v 2] to [v0,v00]. Obviously, λM (v00)=1and
R(v00) < 1.N o w , s i n c e λM (v) and R(v) are both increasing and (weakly) concave
functions, then:
R(v) < λM (v) for all v ∈ (v
0,v
00) (37)
(iii) First, note that for some v000 >v 2, γ (0,v000,1) > 0. Then, for any v>v 000,t h e
bad equilibrium vanishes from the economy. Now, since we have proved in (ii) that







.N o t et h a tw h e nv =
φ
δ, λt =1and rt,t+1 =1 , for all t.Q . E . D .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : Let us denote by Πg and Πb, the probabilities of
choosing the good and the bad equilibrium, respectively, with Πg + Πb < 1. Then,
the variance of the equilibrium value, for a given v ∈ (w0,v 2),i sg i v e nb yt h en e x t
equation:
V (λ(v)) = (1 − Πg − Πb)(Πg + Πb)(λm (v))
2 +( 1− Πg)Πg (R(v))
2 (38)
−2(1− Πg − Πb)ΠgλmR(v)
When v is close to w0, taking derivatives and assuming, for simplicity, that Πg =
















34This is true since it can be showed that
∂λm(v)
∂v →− ∞as v → w0.N o w ,i fv is close
to v2, and noting that
∂λm(v)
∂v → 0 as v → v2,w eh a v et h a t :
∂V (λ(v))
∂v





P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 :Assume, without loss of generality, that v0 <w 0.T h e n
λ1 =0 .S i n c e gl (δ) >w 0, then with positive probability λ2 = δv1
φ > λ1 =0 .
By induction, we can construct increasing sequences for λt and vt, with positive
probability. Since ls (λ) is decreasing in λ, gl (ls) is decreasing in ls,a n dgl (ε) →∞
as ε → 0,a ts o m ep o i n tτ,g i v e nλτ, vτ ≥
φ
δ.I fs u c hλτ exists with positive probability,
then λτ+1 =1with the same probability. Once the economy reaches this stage, for
all t ≥ τ +1 , λτ =1=λ
∗ and vt = fl (δ,1) = v∗.A tt h i sp o i n t ,rt,t+1 =1 .
The behavior of the interest rate is as follows. If λt+1 = R(vt),t h e nrt,t+1 =
r0 (R(vt)).I f λt+1 <R (vt),t h e nrt,t+1 =1 .I f R(vt) > 1,t h e nλt+1 =1and
rt,t+1 =1 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7:












φ < 1 and rt,t+1 =1if δvt










.A l l t h e
variables depend on just vt.
(ii) Assume, without loss of generality, that v0 =0 . Then, since v1 >v 0,w e
have λ2 > λ1. We can continue this reasoning by induction. If vt−1 <v t < δ
φ,t h e n
λt < λt+1.S i n c els (λ) is decreasing in λ, gl (ls (λ)) is decreasing in ls,a n dgl (ε) →∞
as ε → 0, at some point τvt ≥ δ
φ.T h e n ,λt+1 =1and vt+1 = fl (δ,1). Then, for any
t ≥ τ +1 , λt = λ






when vt < δ
φ. To prove this, just note that
∂Πa(λ)
∂λ > 0 and
∂Πs(λ)
∂λ < 0.W h e nvt > δ
φ,
rt,t+1 =1 . This drastic change in the interest rate is associated to a change in the
regime: from a constrained to an unconstrained economy. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8:
(i) Since, by assumption, f (l,0) − φ >g(l) for all l; all the agents with wealth
greater than φ (i.e. with ability greater than
φ
vt) will pay the entry cost at t and







Given λt+1,t h e nvt+1 = v(λt+1),w h e r ev(λ) is the function deﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
(ii) Note that, in equation (41), λt+1 is an increasing function of vt.A l s o ,v(λ)
is an increasing function of λ. Given the condition for growth in this economy,
v1 = gl (δ) >
φ





> λ1 =0 . Following by induction, we can
establish increasing sequences for λt and vt when vt <
φ
α.S i n c e ls (λ) is decreasing
and gl (ε) →∞as ε → 0, there exists some ﬁnite τ at which vt ≥
φ
α. From then on,
λt =1=λ
∗,f o ra l lt,a n dvt = fl (δ,1) = v∗,f o ra l lt. Q.E.D.
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38Figure 1: Kernel estimation of the conditional mean
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Figure 5: Multiplicity of Equilibria
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